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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
and resulting from the employment without the hindrance of strict
rules which might prevent a true determination of whether or not
there was an actual abandonment of employment. Of course, the
result is a determination of each case on its own peculiar facts,
but this would seem to be the intent of the broadly-worded work-
men's compensation acts.
Charles Henry Rudolph, Jr.
ABSTRACTS
Criminal Law-Conspiracy-Defendant Has Absolute
Right to Separate Trial
D was indicted with five others for conspiracy to commit
murder. The trial court overruled his motion for severance, and
a writ of prohibition was brought on his behalf. Held, writ awarded.
A defendant jointly indicted for a felony has the absolute right
to elect a separate trial. State ex rel. Zirk v. Muntzing, 120 S.E.2d
260 (W. Va. 1961).
At common law severance by either the defendants or the state
was a matter of judicial discretion. This rule was modified by the
legislature, and the instant case is the first to explicitly interpret
the statute, where a defendant's right to separate trial is at issue.
W. VA. CODE ch. 62, art. 3, § 8 (Michie 1955). The statute pro-
vides that joint defendants must agree on which jurors to strike
or the prosecuting attorney will strike for them to reduce the panel
to twelve. But if the defendants "elect to be, or are, separately
tried . . ." the normal procedure for striking shall be followed.
The attorney general contended that taking the statute as a whole,
it did not grant an unqualified right to elect a separate trial.
Another statute could have a bearing on the matter of severance
in conspiracy cases. Persons who conspire and attempt to inflict
injury on another may be indicted for a felony under the provisions
of the "Red Men's" statute. W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 6, § 7 (Michie
1955). The prosecution may indict the accused either jointly or
severally. It is arguable that if the state has the choice of how it
may indict, then the defendants can not have the choice of how
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they shall be tried. Of what value is a joint indictment if as a
matter of right the defendant can defeat it by demanding a separate
trial? Further, a special statute providing for the trial of a con-
spiracy charge is to be preferred over a general statute relating
to venire.
Certainly the result of this case was predictible. In two prior
decisions involving the venire statute, the West Virginia Supreme
Court said in dicta that the defendant's right to separate trial was
absolute. In State v. Roberts, 50 W. Va. 422, 40 S.E. 484 (1901),
the denial of defendant's motion for joint trial was affirmed. In
State v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 132, 42 S.E. 230 (1902), defendants'
attempt to withdraw a motion for severance was properly refused
by the trial court since the state had also asked for separate trial.
In comparison, Virginia has a similar statute relating to venire,
and includes the phrase "elects to be separately tried. .. " VA.
CODE ANNOT. § 19.1-202 (Repl. Vol. 1960). No decision in point
has been reached, but a defendant's right to separate trial is accepted
as a matter of course. 46 VA. L. REv. 1495 (1960). This view
was affirmed in a case identical in issue to the Prater case, supra.
Campbell v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 507, 112 S.E.2d 115 (1960).
Evidence-View by Jury in Eminent Domain Proceedings
In a jury trial in eminent domain proceedings, condemnor's
motion for a view of the premises was denied. Held, reversed. A
view of the premises is attainable as a matter of right by either party.
Such a view is evidence to be considered by the jury in ascertaining
just compensation for the land condemned and damages to the
residue. State Road Comm'n v. Milam, 120 S.E.2d 254 (W. Va.
1961).
Two questions of substantial importance were clarified by this
case. First, two sections of the Code apparently conflict as to
whether the parties have an absolute right to a view. One provides
that a view is proper "when it shall appear to the court... neces-
sary to a just decision... ." W. VA. CODE ch. 56, art. 6, § 17 (Michie
1955). The other provides that, where a jury is impaneled to ar-
rive at compensation and damages after the submission of the com-
missioner's report, it shall proceed under the lawful requirements
binding on the commissioners, which in part require a view of the
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premises. W. VA. CODE ch. 54, art. 2, §§ 9, 10 (Michie 1955).
On this point the special statute in the chapter on eminent domain
governs over the general statute in the chapter on pleadings and
practice. A prior decision, which did not apply the special statute,
arrived at a contrary result and to that extent was overruled. Simms
v. Dillon, 119 W. Va. 284, 193 S.E. 331 (1937).
Second, the findings of a view constitute admissible evidence
to be considered by the jury in its determination of compensation
and damages in eminent domain proceedings. Some American courts
hold that since the findings can not be admitted to record, it is
not evidence. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 183 (1954). And sev-
eral West Virginia decisions had implied that a view only enabled
a jury to understand and apply the evidence or that a view was
ancillary. See State Road Comm'n v. Sanders, 125 W. Va. 143,
23 S.E.2d 113 (1942), and cases cited therein. This position is
not now approved. In a review of those cases coupled with other
decisions that adhere to the position that a view is evidence, Dean
Hardman concluded that any seeming inconsistency in the cases is
not actual. Hardman, The Evidentiary Effect of a View: Stare
Decisis or Stare Dictis?, 53 W. VA. L. REv. 103 (1951). The
leading case in accord with the present holding approved an in-
struction as correct which prescribed in part that a view is evidence.
Guyandot Valley Ry. v. Buskirk, 57 W. Va. 417, 50 S.E. 521
(1905).
Federal Courts--Comity-Enjoining Prosecution of Compulsory
Counterclaim. in Another District
Lessor brought action in a federal district court for breach of
an equipment lease. The lessee answered and counterclaimed, alleg-
ing a prior breach by the lessor. Subsequently, the lessee filed suit
in an Alabama federal district court, adding a new claim of fraud.
Lessor appeared to ask the Alabama district court to stay prosecu-
tion which was denied. Lessor then asked the same of the New
York district court which granted the stay. Held; affirmed. Any
claim before the Alabama court would be considered in New York
under the compulsory counterclaim rule or be precluded. New
York attained first jurisdiction; that court then had the right to
enjoin the lessee from furthering his Alabama action. National
Equipment Rental v. Fowler, 287 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1961).
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One judge dissented on the ground that the Alabama denial
of the stay should be accepted by the New York court, if not under
the rule of res judicata, then by virtue of comity, and failure to do
so was abuse of discretion. Of primary concern is the prevention
of a multiplicty of actions. But the result would be to penalize the
lessor for protecting his rights in the wrong court. Where plaintiff,
after filing suit in one district court actually defended himself on
the same matter in a second district court, he did not thereby abandon
his first suit and was permitted to proceed after the second one
was stymied by a hung jury. Brooks Transp. Co. v. McCutcheon,
154 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
The dissenting judge also took issue with the majority because
it based its decision on the compulsory counterclaim rule. FED. R.
Crv. P. 13 (a). That is, the fraud pleaded in Alabama is pleadable
in New York. Therefore, the majority necessarily considered the
actions essentially the same, and the court of first jurisdiction should
hear the case. Joseph Bancroft & Sons v. Spunize Co. of Am., 268
F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1959). But the dissent pointed out that this
subverts other jurisdictional considerations such as convenience to
the parties and witnesses to the priority of action rule. Hammett
v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 176 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1949). The penalty
for failure to assert a counterclaim is not to deny the lessee his
right of action in Alabama, but the preclusion of that claim in
New York.
Federal Courts--Jurisdiction-Claim Under FELA Need Not
Involve Minimum Jurisdictional Amount
In federal district court P sought and recovered damages less
than 10,000 dollars under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for
a sprained ankle and loss of earnings. The district court founded
its jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1137 (1958), which grants a district
court authority to hear controversies arising under any acts regu-
lating commerce. Held, the lower court had jurisdiction, although P
did not assert the normal minimum claim. 1mm v. Union Ry., 289
F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1961).
Two sections of the federal code which confer substantial
original jurisdiction on federal district courts require a minimum
claim of 10,000 dollars. These are the general federal question and
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the diversity of citizenship provisions. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332
(1958). Other provisions grant jurisdiction regardless of the amount
in controversy. Among these is one which confers original jurisdic-
tion in "any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of
Congress regulating. commerce ... " 28 U.S.C. § 1137 (1958).
D asked the lower court for a special finding that at no time did the
amount in controversy exceed 10,000 dollars. D then contended that
the FELA is not regulatory in nature, although D did not thereby
challenge its constitutional foundation. The circuit court failed to
give any merit to D's argument. In holding the FELA statute con-
stitutional, the United States Supreme Court considered it to be
regulatory in nature. Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R.R., 223
U.S. 1 (1912).
James Kilgore Edmundson, Jr.
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